Ideas from 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic' by Kit Fine [1975], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Vagueness: a Reader' (ed/tr Keefe,R /Smith,P) [MIT 1999,0-262-61145-7]].

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1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis

9766	Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

9775	Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates

5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth

9771	Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic

9768	Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness

9776	A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness

9767	A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise

9770	Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values

9772	Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision)

9773	With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work

9774	Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

9769	Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers